The literature on the economics of fiscal decentralization stresses the potential for both positive and negative effects on governance in a country. Using a data set comprising sixty-four developed and developing economies and several different measures of fiscal decentralization, the authors find that countries in which a larger share of fiscal revenues and expenditures are located at the level of subnational governments appear to be less corrupt. The authors also find that the beneficial impact of fiscal decentralization on corruption is mitigated in the presence of mechanisms enforcing vertical administrative decentralization. The results indicate that fiscal decentralization appears to reduce corruption even in countries in which there is a high degree of political representation. The results are robust to alternative estimation methodologies and to specifications that control for the influence of variables that have been identified as affecting governance.
The literature on the economics of fiscal decentralization stresses the potential for both positive and negative effects on the quality of governance in a country. Several economists have made the case for fiscal decentralization as a means to promote better governance. For example, Oates (1972) argues that decentralized governments will be better informed about local conditions and better able to satisfy citizen preferences. Seabright (1996) and Tabellini (2000) make the same case based on citizens being better informed about the activities of local governments and therefore better placed to reward or punish local politicians according to their performance. Weingast (1995) and Montinola, Yingyi, and Weingest (1995) argue that fiscal decentralization means that economic agents have the ability to leave more corrupt regions, which would tend to improve governance. Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) and de Mello (2000) argue that fiscal decentralization strengthens social capital and encourages political participation. Also, the World Bank (2004) suggests that the resulting competition between centers of authority reduces the risk that governments will expropriate wealth.
Other economists have argued that fiscal decentralization can undermine governance. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) , Tanzi (1995) , and Prud'homme (1995) argue that the local officials are more susceptible to capture by local economic interests. Prud'homme (1995) and Tabellini (2000) further suggest that the harmful effects may result because local government activities are less intensely monitored than central government activities. Hommes (1995) , the World Bank (1999), and Fukasaku and de Mello (1999) argue that fiscal decentralization may lead to poor accountability and governance if expenditures and revenue mobilization functions are not clearly assigned across different levels of government.
The few relevant empirical studies have had rather mixed results. Cross-country studies in this vein include De Mello and Barenstein (2001) , who report that a range of governance indicators improve as the share of subnational government spending in total spending increases; Fisman and Gatti (2002) , who find that revenue and expenditure decentralization reduce corruption; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) , who report that governance indicators improve when fiscal decentralization is combined with strong national parties; and Kyria and Roca-Sagalés (2011) who find that fiscal decentralization has a positive impact on the quality of government in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, though these effects are mitigated in the presence of regional elections and multilevel government. In contrast, Treisman (2002) finds that any relationship between corruption and fiscal decentralization is highly sensitive to the control variables included, and Dreher (2006) finds that fiscal decentralization is consistent with improvements in a number of key governance indicators mainly in low-income countries.
In this article, we focus on the relation between fiscal decentralization and the corruption aspect of governance. We add substantially to the empirical literature by presenting results using a revamped data set of several different measures of fiscal decentralization in developed and developing economies, by taking account of vertical administrative arrangements governing decentralization, by employing different estimation methodologies, and by controlling for variables representing the degree of political accountability that Lederman, Loayza, and Soares (2005) have shown to dominate alternative explanations of corruption. We report three findings. First, countries in which a larger share of fiscal revenues and expenditures are located at the level of subnational government appear to be less corrupt. Second, the beneficial impact of fiscal decentralization on corruption is mitigated in the presence of mechanisms enforcing vertical administrative decentralization, specifically, a federal constitution that provides for limited autonomy at the subnational level or an electoral system in which the bottom tier of government is directly elected. This suggests that higher shares of general revenue and expenditure at the level of the subnational government are most effective in reducing corruption when those resources are nonetheless controlled by the central government. Third, fiscal decentralization appears to reduce corruption even in countries in which there is a high degree of political representation, a factor that has been shown in other studies to dominate explanations of corruption. These results are robust to alternative estimation methodologies, including using panel instrumental variable (IV) procedures to control for endogeneity and other potential biases.
Our article makes several contributions. First, it adds to the large empirical literature that has studied the general economic effects of fiscal decentralization. While these studies have often recognized the shortcomings of subnational government revenue and expenditure shares as reliable indicators of fiscal decentralization, our results testify to the importance of also incorporating administrative arrangements for decentralization into empirical work. Second, it acts as a counterweight to the literature on the determinants of corruption that emphasizes the dominance of political accountability as an explanation since our results are robust to the inclusion of such variables. Finally, our article adds to the policy-oriented Altunbaş and Thornton 3 fiscal decentralization literature in that the results lend support to economists who take a more positive view of fiscal decentralization as a means of promoting better governance, though with the added qualification that the extent to which it does so depends in part on the administrative arrangements governing vertical decentralization.
Data and Summary Statistics
To conduct our analysis, we use measures of corruption, fiscal decentralization, political decentralization, and political representation. In addition, we employ a set of baseline control variables that other researchers have shown to impact on corruption.
Corruption
Following many other corruption-related studies (e.g., Fisman and Gatti 2002; Mauro 1995 Mauro , 1998 , our indicator of corruption is the index of corruption in government produced by the International Country Risk Guide (2001) . This variable is meant to capture the likelihood that government officials will demand special payments. The extent to which illegal payments are expected throughout lower levels of government is subjectively ranked by panels of international experts (Knack and Keefer 1995) on a scale from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating less corruption; however, to facilitate ease of interpretation of the coefficients, we have rescaled the corruption index to take on values between 0 (least corrupt) and 1 (most corrupt).
Fiscal Decentralization
To measure fiscal decentralization, we make use of recent revisions and updates of the fiscal decentralization indicators in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Government Finance Statistics Yearbook described in Dziobek, Mangas, and Kufa (2011) . These authors present data on fiscal decentralization for about eighty countries over periods of up to twenty years (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . The data set allows four measures of fiscal decentralization: subnational (state and local) government revenues, tax effort (defined as the sum of tax revenue and compulsory social security contributions), expenditure, and compensation of employees (the wage bill), each of which can be expressed as a proportion of general government revenues and expenditures. These data are available on an accruals and cash basis for a few countries, but countries typically report in either one or the other format. As there can be substantial differences between the accrual and cash series, we employ accrual accounting fiscal data because these match the time of recording to actual resource flows and are consistent with other macroeconomic data sets (e.g., national accounts data are prepared on an accrual basis).
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While the IMF has long been the most popular data source for crosscountry studies of fiscal decentralization, it is well known that these indicators are flawed in the sense that they do not fully distinguish between ''administrative'' and ''substantive'' decentralization because they do not recognize that high subnational revenue and spending shares do not necessarily indicate high local autonomy. For example, surveys of fiscal relations by Joumard and Kongsrud (2003) and Darby, Muscatelli, and Roy (2003) show that limits on the discretion of subnational governments to determine tax rates and tax bases significantly reduce local fiscal autonomy, and Thornton (2007a Thornton ( , 2007b shows that empirical estimates that fail to take account of the degree of local autonomy can give misleading results.
Administrative Decentralization
We try to control for the shortcomings of the IMF data as an indicator of fiscal decentralization by interacting the fiscal decentralization indicators with three indicators of administrative subnational autonomy. The first indicator is a dummy variable to capture whether the country has a federal constitution, on the assumption that such countries will have more devolved fiscal responsibilities. Second, we include a dummy variable to indicate whether the bottom tier of government is directly elected, on the assumption that directly elected subnational governments are more likely to have been devolved some fiscal responsibility. Finally, to account for the distribution of political power among the central and subnational governments, we include a dummy variable to signify whether the constitution allows for limited autonomy at the level of the subnational government. These variables provide insight into whether institutional arrangements accentuate or mitigate the impact of fiscal decentralization on corruption. For example, Dreher (2006) and Kyria and Roca-Sagalés (2011) have shown that vertical decentralization, measured by the number of subnational government tiers, tends to deteriorate governance. The dummy representing whether a country has a federal constitution is constructed from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook 2010, and the dummies for an elected bottom tier of government and limited local autonomy are from Treisman (2000) . Political Representation Lederman, Loayz, and Soares (2005) show that political accountability variables are not only robust determinants of corruption but they also dominate alternative explanations of corruption. Accordingly, we include three proxies for political accountability in our estimates: an index of press freedom, a dummy variable to indicate whether a country has maintained democratic institutions for a continuous period since 1950, and a dummy variable to indicate that a country is a presidential democracy. The first two political representation variables are included because governance is likely to be better in democratic countries and in countries with a free press and more vigorous civic associations-that is, in countries where politicians are more accountable (Adserà, Boix, and Payne 2003) . Lederman, Loayza, and Soares (2005) argue that a presidential democracy would have a positive impact on corruption since the leaders of the executive branch are more difficult to remove than in parliamentary systems. The index of press freedom is from Freedom House, the continuous democracy dummy is from Treisman (2000) , and the presidential democracy series is from Beck et al. (2001) .
Baseline Controls
Our baseline control variables are a country's real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, its population, a dummy variable to indicate whether the country is a major fuel exporter, and a country's degree of ethnic fractionalization. Real GDP per capita is included because richer countries tend to be more decentralized (Panizza 1999) and have better government quality (Islam and Montenegro 2002) , and because these conditions tend to create a demand for better government (La Porta et al. 1999 ). In addition, real GDP per capita should capture increases in the volume and size of economic transactions, which would increase the benefits of developing institutions such as commercial codes and their associated adjudication and enforcement mechanisms (Knack 2001) . Population is included as an indicator of country size to capture economies of scale in establishing effective institutions (Srinivasan 1986; Knack 2001) and also because there is some evidence that more populous countries tend to be more decentralized and to have lower government quality (Treisman 2002) . Ethnic fractionalization is included because political theories predict that, as ethnic heterogeneity increases, governments become more interventionist and less efficient, the quality of public goods falls, and political freedoms are restricted (La Porta et al. 1999) . Finally, many economists have argued that governance could be undermined if countries receive substantial nontax revenues (e.g., from natural resource rents) because citizens are likely to be less motivated to scrutinize how government revenues are collected and spent (Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Leite and Weidmann 2002) . Presumably, this argument could apply even if these revenues were decentralized. We try to control for this possibility by including a dummy to capture whether a country is a major energy exporter. The data for real GDP per capita and population are from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009) , and the ethnic fractionalization data are from Alesina et al. (2003) .
Summary Statistics and Correlations
The data set comprises annual observations for up to sixty-four developed and developing economies for the period 1995-2008, though observations are not available for all countries for all years. Summary statistics and correlations are presented in table 1. The main points to note are the substantial cross-country variation in the summary statistics (panel A), including in the fiscal decentralization indicators, with the measures of decentralization ranging from .14 to .82, and that the correlation coefficients are relatively low (panel B), with the exception of those for the fiscal decentralization indicators, which range from .75 to .97.
Econometric Methodology
We begin with cross-section regressions in which we use one observation per country, so that a period is defined as the range of years for which we have data for that country. The basic specification is as follows:
where COR it is the corruption index; FDEC it is, alternatively, subnational government revenues, tax effort, expenditures, or the wage bill; INS i is the set of dummy variables capturing political and administrative arrangements for decentralization; POL i is the set of political accountability variables; and X i is the set of baseline controls that comprises the natural log of real per capita GDP, the natural log of a country's population, the ethnic fractionalization ratio, and a dummy variable indicating whether a country is a major energy exporter. Cross-sectional regressions are subject to the shortcoming that they do not fully control for unobserved country-specific effects and do not exploit the time-series dimension of the available data (though in many cases, there is little or no variation in the series over time). Accordingly, we also provide results from pooled time-series cross-sectional (panel) estimates for the four indicators of fiscal decentralization. The annual data in these estimates cover the period 1995-2008. As data for some countries are not available for all years, the panel is unbalanced with the number of observations depending on the choice of explanatory variable.
Endogeneity Considerations
The relationship between fiscal decentralization and changes in the quality of governance might be driven by reverse causation. For example, Fisman and Gatti (2002) note that corrupt officials of the central government might be reluctant to allow fiscal decentralization, as this would attenuate their ability to extract rents. The presence of endogeneity has generally been dealt with through the use of instrumental variables (IVs). As instruments for fiscal decentralization, we use dummies identifying countries' legal origins (British, French, Socialist, and Germanic). Legal origins have been used quite extensively and successfully as instruments in the fiscal decentralization literature (Dreher 2006; Fisman and Gatti 2002; de Mello and Barenstein 2001) . The justification for their use is the affinity of a civil legal code (as opposed to common code) for government decentralization and the likelihood that legal origin is only indirectly related to governance. The IV estimates would give consistent results under the assumptions that there is no second-order serial correlation and that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms. We test for the validity of these assumptions and present the test results below.
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Empirical Results
We start with the cross-country cross-section results, which are reported in tables 2 through 4. Basic results incorporating just the fiscal decentralization indicators and baseline control variables are reported in table 2. Columns 1 through 4 report results from ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, and columns 5 through 8 report the IV estimates. The two sets of results are broadly similar. The coefficients on all the fiscal decentralization indicators are negative and statistically significant. In terms of magnitudes, the OLS estimates indicate that a 1 standard deviation increase in fiscal decentralization will be associated with a reduction in corruption rating of between 0.33 (tax effort decentralization) and 0.54 (wage bill Altunbaş and Thornton 9 Note: White robust standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The corruption index has been rescaled to take on values between 0 (least corrupt) and 1 (most corrupt).
decentralization) of a standard deviation, which is substantially larger than Fisman and Gatti's (2002) finding of a 0.30 standard deviation reduction for revenue decentralization and which underlines the need to make an assessment based on a range of decentralization indicators. 4 The coefficients on the log of population and of real GDP per capita are statistically significant and of the expected sign in all of the regressions: more highly populated countries are more corrupt and wealthier countries are less corrupt. The energy exporter dummy is statistically significant only in the IV results, where the coefficient is consistent with natural resource rents promoting corruption. The ethnic fractionalization ratio is not statistically significant. In the IV estimates, the J-test statistic of overidentifying restrictions is not statistically significant, suggesting that the legal origin variables are valid instruments. In addition, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) statistics are statistically significant and indicate that endogeneity of fiscal decentralization with the instruments has a highly significant effect on the estimate, which is consistent with the exogeneity of fiscal decentralization with respect to corruption. Table 3 reports the IV estimates that include the interactions between the fiscal decentralization measures and the different political and administrative arrangements for decentralization. Four points are noteworthy. First, the coefficients on the fiscal decentralization terms remain statistically significant and negative except when the variable interacts with a country having an elected bottom tier of government. Second, the political and administrative arrangements interact to mitigate the beneficial impact of fiscal decentralization on corruption, which is consistent with the findings of Dreher (2006) and Kyria and Roca-Sagalés (2011) . Specifically, federal structures and, to a lesser extent, countries with a constitution that grants limited autonomy to subnational governments tend to reduce substantially the beneficial impact that fiscal decentralization has in reducing corruption. Third, in these estimates, population, real GDP per capita, and energy exporter control variables generally remain statistically significant and of the expected sign. Finally, though the J-statistics remain appropriate, the DWH test statistics do not support the exogeneity of fiscal decentralization with respect to corruption in three of the estimates (columns 5, 7, and 8).
The beneficial impact of fiscal decentralization on corruption remains robust to the inclusion of the political representations control variables. These results are reported in table 4. The size of the coefficient on the fiscal decentralization indicators is reduced somewhat but remains negative and statistically significant. There is some variation in the statistical significance of the interaction terms, but the earlier conclusion holds: where the interaction terms are statistically significant, their impact is to mitigate the Note: White robust standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The corruption index has been rescaled to take on values between 0 (least corrupt) and 1 (most corrupt). Note: White robust standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The corruption index has been rescaled to take on values between 0 (least corrupt) and 1 (most corrupt).
benefits of fiscal decentralization on corruption. The political representation controls are all statistically significant and of the expected sign: countries with long periods of continuous democracy and a free press are associated with less corruption, and countries with presidential democracies are associated with more corruption (compared to parliamentary democracies). Inclusion of the political representation variables appears to affect the baseline control variables, with only population remaining statistically significant. In general, the J-test statistics and DWH test statistics remain satisfactory. The panel estimation results are reported in table 5 and confirm the findings of the cross-Sectional estimates. The coefficients on each of the fiscal decentralization variables are negative and statistically significant, and the beneficial impact of fiscal decentralization on corruption is again substantially mitigated by the interaction variable. The impact of the political representation variables on corruption is statistically significant and of the expected sign, and the coefficients on the baseline control variables are generally statistically significant and of the expected sign. The J-test statistics for overidentifying restrictions and DWH statistics are again generally satisfactory in regard to the validity of the instruments and the exogeneity of fiscal decentralization.
Conclusion
We have focused in this article on the impact of fiscal decentralization on the corruption aspect of governance employing a wider range of decentralization measures and a broader range of control variables than used in much of the empirical literature. Our results provide strong support to the view that fiscal decentralization has a beneficial impact on improving governance in a country by reducing corruption. This result is robust to controlling for interactions between fiscal decentralization and administrative arrangements for decentralization, for political representation variables that other studies have shown to dominate explanations of corruption, and for the level of development, country size, ethnic fractionalization, and a country being a major energy exporter. Our results testify to the importance of also incorporating formal institutional arrangements for decentralization into empirical work. Subnational government autonomy appears to reduce the beneficial impact of fiscal decentralization on corruption, which suggests that fiscal decentralization is most effective in reducing corruption when these resources are nonetheless largely directed by the central government. Our results also act as a counterweight to the literature on the determinants of corruption that emphasizes the dominance of political
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accountability variables. Finally, our results lend support to economists who take a more positive view of fiscal decentralization as a means to promote better governance.
